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I. INTRODUCTION
The asbestos litigation in its many forms has been, by all accounts, a blight on
the American judicial system.' Few observers believe that our tort system was
1. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCEAD HoCCOMM. ONASBEsTOS LITIG., REPORTTO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 2 (1991) (stating that the asbestos situation is a "disaster of major proportions to both the
victims and producers of asbestos products"). The report further notes that:
[D]ockets in both Federal and State courts continue to grow; long delays are
routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over again;
transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion
of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose
altogether.
Id. at 2-3; see also Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (noting that the tort system
is beset by an "elephantine mass of asbestos cases" that "defies customary judicial administration");
Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 541 (1992) ("Most commentators agree that tort litigation today is a highly
unsatisfactory system for resolving claims arising out of workers' exposure to asbestos."); Steven L.
Schultz, Comment, In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and
Backlogged-A Proposalfor the Use ofFederal Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK.
L. REV. 553,590 (1992) ("The traditional tort system, in connection with asbestos litigation, has been
marked by high transaction costs, excessive delays in providing compensation to injured plaintiffs,
unequal recoveries among identically injured victims, litigious parties and ajudicial system clogged
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designed to deal with a national tragedy engendered by a product that has caused
and will cause serious harm to thousands of Americans over a period of at least
seven decades. What is most disturbing is that some aspects of the legal problems
associated with asbestos have been exacerbated needlessly. Giving in to enormous
pressure, some courts have recognized theories of recovery that are both
substantively unfair and certain to favor claimants whose suffering is minor over
claimants who will suffer serious harm in the future.2 Most courts have rid
themselves of such myopia,3 but bad law tends to hang on.4 It is high time that the
courts cleansed themselves entirely of illegitimate doctrine.
Asbestos litigation's final descent into madness has come in the form ofjudicial
recognition of anticipatory claims on behalf of persons who have not yet suffered
injury. Departing from long-standing tradition in tort law, courts have sought to
provide immediate compensation to plaintiffs who are asymptomatic and in good
health for consequences that they may suffer in the future as a result of either
exposure to asbestos- or the development of asymptomatic biological changes in
their lungs. 6 Plaintiffs have devised three stratagems for receiving "pay me now"
compensation. First, they argue that those exposed to asbestos should be entitled to
immediate recovery based on the fact that, upon exposure, plaintiffs are at increased
risk of contracting asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung cancer.7 These claims seek
recovery for the value of physical harms based on the possibility that plaintiffs may
by an avalanche of cases.").
2. For a detailed description of the various manifestations resulting from exposure to asbestos
see Schuck, supra note 1, at 544-549. The range of consequences arising from exposure to asbestos
vary significantly and include: (1) Asbestos Fibres in Lung. Any exposure to asbestos may result in
asbestos fibers lodging in the lung. The mere lodging of such fibers in the lung is asymptomatic and
need not result in pulmonary harm. (2) Pleural plaque'or pleural thickening. Subsequent to asbestos
exposure, calcified tissue may form on the pleura, the membranes surrounding the lung. Most often
those experiencing pleural plaque and thickening are asymptomatic. They can lead active, normal
lives free of any pain and suffering. (3) Asbestosis. When inhaled, asbestos fibers may begin a
scarring process that destroys air sacs in the lung where oxygen is transferred into the blood. This
disease is non-malignant, but nevertheless, may result in decreased pulmonary function. Asbestosis
sufferers may encounter shortness of breath, a dry cough, weight loss, and chest pain. (4)
Mesothelioma. The most serious of the diseases that may follow asbestos exposure is a malignant
tumor in the membranes lining the lungs, abdomen, and chest. Mesothelioma is an incurable form of
cancer resulting in the victim's death within seven to fifteen months after its onset. Mesothelioma is
almost alvays caused by asbestos. (5) Lung Cancer. General lung cancer can be caused by asbestos
but may be unrelated to asbestos. There may also be a symbiotic relationship between asbestos and
smoking in causing lung cancer. Id.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 27-99.
4. See, e.g., Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc., 801 So. 2d 501, 514 (La. CL App. 2001), cert. granted,
804 So. 2d 649 (La. 2002).
5. Id. at 511.
6. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83-85 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying New
Jersey law and allowing recovery for fear of cancer based on. plaintiff having developed pleural
thickening); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257,263 (N.J. 1989) (same).
7. For cases in which plaintiffs sought immediate compensation for increased risk of developing
cancer in the future, see, for example, Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 523-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Capital
Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Ky. 1994).
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develop these diseases in the future. Second, plaintiffs claim that quite apart from
any physical consequences that they may actually suffer in the future, they are
entitled to damages for the present fear that they experience concerning their future
well-being.' These claims are premised on the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress and seek to draw on that theory for recovery.9 Third, claimants
contend that those exposed to asbestos are ipso facto entitled to medical
surveillance to determine whether they are experiencing changes in their health that
might be related to the development of some asbestos-related disease over the
course of time.'"
All of these theories are superficially plausible, if not downright appealing.
However, any attempt to embrace them within the mainstream of traditional tort law
is manifestly unwise. In truth, they constitute radical departures from longstanding
norms of tort law, advanced in recent years to bludgeon a disfavored group of
defendants. But the wrongdoing of a defendant, or defendants, does not justify
creating legal doctrine that is substantively unfair, especially when doing so strikes
mercilessly at another group of plaintiffs who, when the fimds to pay damages run
dry, will be denied recovery for real, rather than anticipated, ills.
This Article chronicles the development of these "front-loaded" theories of tort
recovery and how the courts have dealt with them. We argue that these theories are
wrong not only for asbestos claims, but also for all forms of toxic tort litigation. We
are aware that some of the positions we take in this Article will be unpopular.
However, we draw strength from the fact that we are writing in a Symposium
dedicated to the memory of our late friend and colleague, Gary Schwartz. To the
best of our knowledge, Gary never addressed the subject under discussion. But
those who knew him and followed his work must know that Gary was prepared to
take on an unpopular cause when he believed that he was defending the integrity
of tort law. His brilliant article attacking the hysteria surrounding the Ford Pinto
8. For cases in which plaintiffs exposed to asbestos or who developed asymptomatic pleural
thickening have made claims for mental distress based on their fear of developing cancer in the future,
see, for example, Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997); In re
Asbestos Litig. Leary Trial, Nos. 87C-09-24, 90C-09-79, 88C-09-78, 1994 WL 721763 at *3-5 (Del.
Super. Ct. June 14, 1994); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 233 (Pa. 1996); Temple-Inland
Forest Prod. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Tex. 1999).
9. The asbestos cases that deal with the right to recover for mental distress rarely explain
whether the underlying theory of recovery is strict liability or negligence. For the most part asbestos
cases are premised on the failure to warn about the danger associated with the use of asbestos. See,
e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1088 (5th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Owens-
Coming Fibreglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 551 (Cal. 1991). In failure to warn cases, strict liability and
negligence tend to merge into a single theory. See, e.g., Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289
(Iowa 1994). In any event, whether the theory be negligence or strict liability, the policy questions as
to whether and when there should be a duty to protect the right of mental tranquility is the same. See
JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODuCrs LIABILrTY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 223-226
(4th ed. 2000).
10. For cases in which asbestos claimants have sought medical monitoring, see, for example,
Burns, 752 P.2d at 30; Simmons, 674 A.2d at 239.
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litigation comes to mind as one example." And his unrelenting opposition to the
unprincipled consumer expectations test as the standard for defining defective
design in products liability is another.12 We hope that our work here continues in
that tradition.
I1. PREINJURY CLAIMS IN A NUTSHELL
A. Asbestos Exposure and the Single-Action Rule
In most tort cases, the law provides a plaintiff one indivisible cause of action
for all damages arising from a defendant's breach of duty. 3 This hoary rule against
splitting a cause of action is designed to prevent vexatious and repetitive litigation
of a single underlying claim when plaintiff's injuries eventually result in damages
that are more serious than originally contemplated.' 4 Classic damages rules allow
a plaintiff who has suffered physical injury to recover damages for future injuries
only if it can be established with reasonable medical probability that such injuries
will actually develop.' 5 It is well understood that, in any individual case, the
likelihood that a plaintiff may be either undercompensated or overcompensated is
real.' 6 Many plaintiffs who subsequently suffer additional injury are not able at the
time of trial to prove with reasonable medical probability (more probably than not)
11. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth ofThe FordPinto Case, 43 RuTGERsL.REv. 1013,1035-47
(1991).
12. Gary T. Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 476 (1979);
Letter from Gary T. Schwartz on behalf of the Product Liability Advisory Council, to Professor
Richard Speidel Professor of Law, Northwestern University School ofLaw (June 4, 1996) (criticizing
the consumer expectation test as a standard for defective design in products liability and arguing that
it should not be the test for liability in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code) (etter on file).
13. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1985);
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.13, at 557 (2d ed. 1977).
14. See McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that
the rule "promotes greater stability in the law, avoids vexatious and multiple lawsuits arising out of
a single tort incident, and is consistent with the absolute necessity of bringing litigation to an end");
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Dowe, 7 S.W. 368, 371 (Tex. 1888) ("The reason for the rule lies
in the necessity for preventing vexatious and oppressive litigation, and its purpose is accomplished
by forbidding the division of a single cause of action so as to maintain several suits when a single suit
will suffice."); see also Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 273 (Tex. 1997) ("The fact that the
plaintiffs actual damages may not be fully known until much later does not affect the determination
of the accrual date .... ).
15. 22 AM. JuR. 2DDamages § 677 (1988) ("Plaintiffs who have submitted proof ofprospective
damages to a reasonable degree of certainty are entitled to submit the question to the jury .... ); C.S.
Wheatley, Jr., Annotation, Future Pain and Suffering as Element ofDamages for Physical Injury, 81
A.L.R. 423, 424 (1932) ("It is well settled that in an action for a personal injury, future pain and
suffering on the part of the injured person in consequence of the injury constitute a proper element
of the damages... provided there is the requisite certainty or probability that such pain and suffering
Uill result.").
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. c (1982) (stating that ajudgment may
be insufficient because the plaintiffs "damages turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in
excess of the judgment").
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that such future injuries will develop. Conversely, medical predictions of future
injury may never eventuate. However, the specter of repetitive litigation and the
lack of finality to litigation present unacceptable costs to the legal system. Thus, the
single-action rule is deeply embedded in the jurisprudence of this country.
With the onset of the asbestos litigation in the 1960s, the need to re-examine
the single-action rule became manifest. The problem was basic. The statute of
limitations for most tort actions begins to run when the plaintiff discovers his
injury. 7 If pleural plaque or asbestosis constitutes physical injury sufficient to
trigger the running of the statute of limitations for all future asbestos-related harms,
plaintiffs are placed in a no-win situation. Asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma all have long latency periods. 8 If a plaintiff who has developed
pleural plaque waits to file suit until he develops either asbestosis or mesothelioma,
or if a plaintiff who has contracted asbestosis waits to file suit until he develops
mesothelioma, his cause of action will be long-ago barred by the typical tort statute
of limitations. 9 On the other hand, if a plaintiff files suit immediately upon the
discovery of some asbestos-related change in his body, such as pleural thickening
or asbestosis, and in this initial action seeks to recover for the possibility that he will
develop an asbestos-related malignancy, he will be unable to recover for such future
losses. As noted earlier, recovery in an initial action for future injury is allowed
only if the plaintiff can prove through competent expert testimony a substantial
(more probable than not) medical probability of developing such a malignant
disease in the future.2" Neither those diagnosed with pleural plaque or pleural
thickening, nor even those who develop asbestosis, can establish that it is more
probable than not that they will ultimately manifest some form of asbestos-related
malignancy.2'
17. See DANB.DOBBs,THELAwoFTORTs § 218 (2000) (explaining the discovery rule); see also
Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Co., 580 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Ky. 1979) ("[W]hen an
injury does not manifest itself immediately the cause of action should accrue not when the injury was
initially inflicted, but when the plaintiff knew or should have known that he had been injured by the
conduct of the tortfeasor."). Clearly when x-rays show pleural plaque or thickening, or a physician
makes a diagnosis ofasbestosis, the statute would begin to run and bar a later claim for mesothelioma
or lung cancer unless these diseases are recognized as separate injuries that constitute different causes
of action.
18. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., 998 P.2d 403, 405-08 (Cal. 2000) (noting that the average
latency period of asbestosis is twenty years, the average latency period of mesothelioma is thirty to
forty years, and that plaintiff had been diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma more then thirty years
after his last exposure to asbestos).
19. See Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2000) ("[T]he single action
rule is a catch 22 for victims of multiple latent diseases [because] '[a] plaintiffwho sues for asbestosis
is precluded from any recovery for a later-developing lethal mesothelioma. But the discovery rule
would preclude a plaintiff with asbestosis from waiting to see if an asbestosis-related cancer later
develops....').
20. See id. at 649 (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Tex. 1966)).
21. See id. (stating that since only fifteen percent of asbestosis victims actually develop
mesothelioma, no asbestosis plaintiff can satisfy the "reasonable medical probability" requirement).
The likelihood that those who have developed pleural thickening will develop mesothelioma or some
other form of cancer is even more remote. See infra text accompanying note 107.
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Given the harshness of the single-action rule, something had to give.
Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of courts abandoned the single-action rule
and now allow separate causes of action later, when a plaintiff actually develops
asbestosis, lung cancer, or mesothelioma.' However, to assist exposed plaintiffs in
the interim, before the legal enlightenment finally arrived, some courts developed
stopgap causes of action to allow asbestos plaintiffs to escape the single-action rule
dilemma. Thus, some courts took the position that recovery for increased risk could
be predicated on proof of less than reasonable medical probability that the plaintiff
would actually develop cancer.' At the same time, a number of courts recognized
22. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding
that diagnosis of asbestosis did not trigger the statute of limitations for other injuries caused by the
same exposure to asbestos); Hamilton, 998 P.2d at 413-14 (holding that under California statute, the
single action rule no longer applied to asbestos plaintiffs); Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship Mgmt. Corp.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533,539 (CL App. 2000) (holding that aplaintiffs discovery of one asbestos-related
disease does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all separate and distinct asbestos-
related diseases caused by the same exposure to asbestos); Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
817 P.2d 111, 112 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that the statute of limitations on a claim for
damages from malignant asbestosis did not begin to run upon plaintiffs earlier knowledge of
existence ofbenign pleural thickening and pleural calcification); Sheppardv. A.C. & S. Co., 498 A.2d
1126, 1134 (Del. Super. CL 1985) (adopting Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111
(D.C. Cir. 1982)) affid. sub nom Keene Corp. v. Sheppard, 503 A.2d 192 (Del. 1986); Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517,519-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[P]laintiffmay bring a second
action for damages if and whenhe actually contracts cancer."); VaSalle v. Celotex Corp., 515 N.E.2d
684,687 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that asbestosis was a legal injury separate and distinct from lung
cancer and action for damages resulting from lung cancer thus accrued when insulator discovered he
had lung cancer, not when he learned he was suffering from asbestosis); Parks v. A.P. Green Indus.,
Inc., 754 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's suit for asbestosis did not
trigger the statute of limitations for lung cancer since they are separate diseases); Wilber v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglass Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 1991) ("The manifestation ofasbestosis does not
trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all separate, distinct, and later-manifested diseases
which may have stemmed from the same asbestos exposure."); Carroll v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 37 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Ky. 2000) (holding that although Kentucky has never been a "two
disease" state, an action for cancer will accrue on the date of the diagnosis of cancer and not the date
of diagnosis ofasbestosis since they are separate and distinct diseases); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Md. 1983) (holding that plaintiffs claim for lung cancer was not time
barred despite a prior diagnosis of asbestosis); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1,
9 (Mich. 1986) (holding that actions for cancer and mesothelioma were not time barred by a previous
asbestosis diagnosis); Fusaro v. Porter-Hayden Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 856, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
(holding that a claim for mesothelioma was not time barred by an earlier asbestosis diagnosis);
Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (articulating the "two-disease
rule" later adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 237
(Pa. 1996)); Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that an earlier
diagnosis of asbestosis did not bar plaintiffs suit for mesothelioma); Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 653
(holding that the single-action rule did not apply to asbestos litigation); Sopha v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 642 (Wis. 1999) ("The diagnosis of a malignant asbestos-related
condition creates a new cause of action and the statute of limitations governing the malignant
asbestos-related condition begins when the claimant discovers, or with reasonable diligence should
discover, the malignant asbestos-related condition.").
23. Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc., 801 So. 2d 501,511 (La. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 804 So.
2d 649 (La. 2002); see also Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984)
(denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for increased risk of
2002]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a cause of action on behalf of asymptomatic plaintiffs for mental distress arising
from the fear that they would develop cancer in the future.24 Unlike the increased-
risk claim in which damages are based directly on the risk of developing cancer in
the future, the mental distress claim avoids dealing with the reasonable medical
probability standard, since the cause of action is based on a plaintiff's currently
existing fear of future injury.
B. The Post Single-Action Era: Bringing Actions Sequentially
As noted earlier, most American jurisdictions have done away with the single-
action rule in asbestos litigation.' Plaintiffs who are diagnosed with asymptomatic
pleural plaque, pleural thickening, or asbestosis need not rush to the courthouse to
file actions for fear that they will be barred by the statute of limitations from doing
so later if they develop asbestosis or asbestos-related malignancies. In most states,
the successful prosecution of one action will not bar plaintiffs from bringing a later
action if they develop a more serious asbestos-related disease.26 Thus, a plaintiff
who has contracted asbestosis can sue immediately to recover damages for the ills
associated with that disease. If ten or fifteen years later he contracts mesothelioma,
he may bring a new action for damages caused by that virulent form of cancer. The
question for the courts, now that plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of waiting until they
have a fully developed disease to bring suit, is whether the law should mandate that
plaintiffs exposed to asbestos must wait until the onset of these diseases to seek
recovery, or whether plaintiffs can pursue pre-injury claims for increased risk,
mental distress, or medical monitoring based on the possibility that they may
develop cancer in the future.
III. WHEN PLAINTIFFS' PREINJURY CLAIMS ARE NOT EVEN SUPERFICIALLY
PLAUSIBLE: RECOVERY FOR INCREASED RISK
Courts that have abolished the single-action rule have flatly rejected claims
based on increased risk." They have done so with regard to both plaintiffs who
contracting cancer).
24. See, e.g., Herber v. Johnson-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1985).
25. See cases cited supra note 22. It remains a mystery to the authors why some asbestos
defendants continue to defend asbestosis and mesothelioma claims on the ground that plaintiff is
precluded from raising these claims when they develop based on the single-action rule. See, e.g.,
Carroll, 37 S.W.3d at 700. The single-action rule forced plaintiffs to seek front-loaded damages for
increased risk ofcancer or for mental distress based on the fear of developing cancer. SeePustejovsky,
35 S.W.3d at 649. Only with the recognition that the single-action rule does not apply to asbestos
claims have the courts been able to delay claims for the more serious asbestos-related diseases until
they actually come to fruition.
26. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher, 481 S.W.2d at 519-523.
27. See id. at 520; see also In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 & n.8 (D.
Haw. 1990); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257,264-265 (N.J. 1989) (providing exhaustive
listing of cases addressing increased risk claims); Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237.
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have asymptomatic pleural plaque or thickening and plaintiffs who have actually
contracted asbestosis. Having preserved the right for plaintiffs to bring actions if
and when they actually develop asbestosis or some form of asbestos-related
malignancy, these courts see no reason to allow speculation about future injuries.
Itmightbe interesting to consider whether a court would bar recovery for increased
risk if faced with a plaintiffmanifesting pleural thickening or asbestosis who could
offer credible testimony that he faces a substantial medical probability of
developing a malignancy. Few such cases are likely to arise because plaintiffs
exposed to asbestos who develop pleural plaque or asbestosis rarely present such
a strong probability of contracting a malignancy.28 However, even if such testimony
were available, it is our view that courts would not, and should not, allow recovery.
The reported decisions reflect no judicial tolerance for guessing at future results.
Claims for increased risk have no place in the post single-action era.
IV. WHEREPLAINTIFFS' PREINJURY CLAIMS ARE SUPERFICIALLYPLAUSIBLE, BuT
TRADITION DENIES RECOVERY: RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
By all accounts, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in recent years have
been on behalf of plaintiffs who have been exposed to asbestos but who, with rare
exceptions, are completely asymptomatic.' Because they cannot claim damages for
present injury (they have none) or for future injury (increased risk claims are
barred), these plaintiffs present claims for mental distress predicated on their present
28. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. In two cases, plaintiffs with asbestosis offered
evidence that there was a greater than fifty percent probability that they would develop cancer. See
Jackson v. Johns-ManviUle Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
29. See JENNIFER L. BIGGS ET AL., OVERVIW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND TRENDS 3 (Dec. 2001),
available athttp://www.actuary.orglpdf/casualty/mono-decO 1asbestos.pdf(estimating thatmore than
ninety percent of current claimants are alleging nonmalignant injuries); Queena Sook Kim, G-I
Holdings' Bankruptcy Filing Cites Exposure in Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12
(reporting that "as many as 80% of [GAF's] asbestos settlements are paid to unimpaired people");
Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of
Representatives, 102d Cong. Ist & 2d Sess. 81, 100 (Oct. 24, 1991) (testimony of Professor Lester
Brickman). Professor Brickman testified:
[P]leural plaque claims account for approximately 80% of new asbestos claim
filings and represent a substantial percentage of previously filed claims. The
existence of tens of thousands of such claims is accounted for by mass
screenings ofindustrial workers financedbyplaintiffs' lawyers and usually done
with active assistance of local union officials. Often, mobile x-ray vans brought
to plant sites are used for the screenings.
Id.; see also Schuck, supra note 1, at 564 ("Another probable reason for the large number of
unimpaired claims relates to the practice of some labor unions and plaintiffs' lawyers who engage in
aggressive claim-solicitation campaigns on a mass basis designed to multiply the number of filed
cases, thereby increasing the pressure on defendants to settle cases wholesale.").
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fear that they may develop a malignancy in the future.30 At first glance, asbestos
plaintiffs who claim mental distress make a plausible argument for recovery. Those
who have been exposed to asbestos, and certainly those whose lungs evidence some
physiological changes such as pleural plaque or thickening, do have a small
increased risk of developing cancer in the future.3' This reality, coupled with the
widespread concern surrounding the asbestos problem, gives facial credence to
plaintiffs' claims that they experience genuine fear that they may develop cancer
in the future. Whether they will develop such a disease in the future or not, the mere
possibility causes current mental distress. Thus, plaintiffs assert that this distress,
caused by the negligence of the defendant, warrants current compensation.
A. Traditional Limitations on the Tort of Mental Distress
Before examining the validity of these claims brought by asbestos plaintiffs and
the special problems attendant to emotional distress claims arising from exposure
to toxic substances, it is important to consider more generally the limitations that
courts have traditionally placed on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In contrast to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress that
swept the country after the adoption by the American Law Institute of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46,32 the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress has had a checkered history. To this very day, American courts have
expressed the view that the "negligent infliction" tort must be substantially limited.
Judges have expressed concern that allowing recovery for mental upset based on
inadvertent conduct is an invitation to open-ended and uncontrollable litigation.33
We note at the outset that compensating for mental distress in most tort cases
based in negligence is noncontroversial. When a defendant negligently harms a
plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffers pain and mental anguish as a result of his physical
injuries, recovery for such parasitic mental distress damages has always been a
staple of American tort law.34 However, a subject of controversy is whether a
plaintiff should recover for mental distress that follows upon the heels of
defendant's conduct that places the plaintiff in physical danger but does not actually
cause harm. For many years courts required, at the very least, that defendant's
negligent conduct result in physical impact upon the plaintiff.3 s Once a physical
30. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83-85 (3d Cir. 1986); In re
Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634,637 (D. Me. 1986); Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28,30
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Simmons, 674 A.2d at 235; Temple Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993
S.W.2d 88, 89 (Tex. 1999).
31. See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
32. SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 46 (1965). Section 46 has been widely adopted. See,
e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613 n.1 (Md. Ct. App. 1977) (listing states that adopted § 46).
33. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER& KEETONONTHE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360 (5th ed.
1984); DOBBS, supra note 17, § 308.
34. DoBBS, supra note 17, § 302.
35. See, e.g., Brisboise v. Kans. City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619,627 (Mo. 1957) (en banc)
("[W]here the defendant is not charged with knowledge that the person involved is other than normal,
[his conduct] should not be made the basis of an action for abnormal damages having their foundation
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impact was established, it was not necessary that the impact have caused physical
harm. If the plaintiff suffered only emotional distress once impact was shown,
recovery was allowed.36 Most courts have now rejected the impact requirement and
allow recovery for mental distress when the defendant's negligence has
demonstrably threatened the plaintiff with imminent physical harm.37 Many
jurisdictions still require that the mental distress result in some form of physical
injury to the plaintiff to guarantee the genuineness of the claim.3 s Others dispense
with this requirement and allow formental distress damages even ifunaccompanied
by physical injury. Finally, the courts have struggled with the problem of when
to allow recovery when the defendant causes a plaintiff-bystander to suffer mental
distress from witnessing injury to a third party.4" Courts disagree regarding the
conditions imposed as a predicate for bystander recovery.4' In any event, while the
question of how the courts have dealt with negligent infliction of mental distress
arising from the direct threat of imminent physical injury to the plaintiff is of great
importance to the discussion of the right to recovery for mental distress in toxic tort
cases, the right of bystanders to recover for peril to others has no direct relevance.
In the toxic tort context, no one has yet claimed that family members have a right
to recover for witnessing the physical anguish of asbestos victims who are suffering
from cancer. No American court would countenance such a claim.42
in mental distress or fright alone."); Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. 1958) ("The rule is
long and well established in Pennsylvania that there can be no recovery of damages for injuries
resulting from fright or nervous shock or mental or emotional disturbances or distress, unless they are
accompanied by physical injury or physical impact.").
36. Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (Ohio 1930) (finding inhalation of smoke during fire
constitutes impact); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (holding that
plaintiff need only establish "any degree of a physical impact, however slight').
37. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich. 1970) ("[W]here a definite and
objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by
defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff... may recover in damages... notwithstanding the
absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock."); Battalla v. State, 176
N.E.2d 729,730-32 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that emotional distress resulting from fear of falling out of
an unsecured chair lift was recoverable even without the occurrence of physical impact).
38. Daley, 179 N.W.2d at 395; see also Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ml.
1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Mass. 1982); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d
894, 896 (RI. 1988). For an extensive review of the authorities holding that emotional distress must
bring about some type ofphysical manifestation or physical consequence before recovery is allowed
see Jones v. CSXTransp., Nos. 01-14786, 01-14787,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6692, at *17-*25 (1 1th
Cir. Apr. 11, 2002).
39. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (en banc); Bass v.
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
40. See DOBBS, supra note 17, § 309.
41. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815-29 (Cal. 1989) (enbanc) (allowing recovery
to plaintiff who was not in the zone of danger); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848 (N.Y. 1984)
(limiting recovery in bystander cases to plaintiffs who are in the zone of danger).
42. Perhaps the most far-reaching case allowing recovery for witnessing the suffering of a
relative is Ochoa v. Sup. Ct., 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985). See infra note 47 and accompanying text. In that
case, however, the court allowed recovery because the parents witnessed the negligent medical
treatment of their child. Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 2-4. The court stated:
[A] distinction between distress caused by personal observation of the
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In reviewing the development of the cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, it is important to reflect on the kinds of fact patterns in which
courts have allowed recovery. The cases are legion. InDaley v. La Croix, as a result
of negligent driving, defendant's car left the highway, traveled 63 feet in the air and
209 feet beyond the edge of the road.43 The car hit a high voltage utility pole,
resulting in a great electrical explosion in the plaintiffs' home." Plaintiffs suffered
severe emotional distress with accompanying physical manifestations of injury.45
The Michigan court abandoned the requirement that physical impact was a
necessary predicate to a mental distress claim and allowed a claim based on the
mental shock to the plaintiffs that resulted in physical harm." Similarly, in Battalla
v. State, a young girl was placed in a ski lift chair by a state employee who failed
to properly lock the safety belt intended to protect the occupant.47 As a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff became hysterical upon the descent from the
mountain and suffered severe emotional distress with resultant physical
manifestations.48 Once again the court departed from the physical impact rule and
allowed plaintiff to recover for her emotional distress, which manifested itself in
physical injuries, caused by being in danger.49
To be sure, not all emotional distress cases are based on events that overtly
threaten direct physical harm. In two rather well known California cases, the court
allowed recovery for serious emotional distress arising from events that were simply
traumatic in nature. In Ochao v. Superior Court, plaintiffs were parents of a child
who was being held in custody atjuvenile hall."0 While there, the child became very
ill with bilateral pneumonia."' The parents witnessed the child in agony and pleaded
for the right to bring in their own physician to treat the child.52 All their requests to
injury and by hearing of the tragedy from another is justified because
compensation should be limited to abnormal life experiences which cause
emotional distress. While receiving news that a loved one has been injured or
has died may cause emotional distress, it is the type of experience for which in
a general way one is prepared, an experience which is common. By contrast few
persons are forced to witness the death or injury of a loved one or to suddenly
come upon the scene without warning in situations where tortious conduct is
involved. In the present case, for example, while it is common to visit a loved
one in a hospital and to be distressed by the loved one's pain and suffering, it is
highly uncommon to witness the apparent neglect of the patient's immediate
medical needs by medical personnel.
Id. at 5 n.6.
43. Daley v. La Croix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Mich. 1970).
44. Id. at 392.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 395-96.
47. Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 729 (N.Y. 1961).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 730-32 (allowing recovery when plaintiff alleged neurological disturbances and
residual physical manifestations).
50. Ochao v. Sup. Ct., 703 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3-4.
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have the child properly treated went on deaf ears. 3 The youngster ultimately died
as a result of his illness.54 He was never transferred from the juvenile hall infirmary
to a hospital facility, nor were x-rays or blood tests taken. The child's mother heard
her child's agonized screaming and saw his convulsing and vomiting." On these
special facts the court recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.56
In an earlier case, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, plaintiff was the
husband of a wife who had been negligently diagnosed as suffering from syphilis.57
As a result of the negligently erroneous diagnosis, plaintiffs wife became upset
because she believed that the plaintiff had been engaged in extramarital sexual
activities." The tension caused by the negligent diagnosis was alleged to have
caused the break-up of the marriage and the initiation of divorce proceedings.59 The
California Supreme Court held that recovery could be allowed for emotional
distress even though such distress was not accompanied by physical injury.6"
A fair review of the cases allowing recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress reveals that this cause of action is quite limited in scope. It was
never designed to allow for compensation for general malaise that follows upon the
heels of negligent conduct. Rather, it allows recovery for serious and immediate
emotional distress arising from conduct that was either violent or traumatic in
nature. With this historical perspective in mind, we now turn to the asbestos-related
mental distress cases. The ovenvhelning majority of courts that have confronted
the question of whether to allow recovery for mental distress when the plaintiff
claims only exposure to asbestos or the onset of pleural plaque have denied such
claims.6 We shall first survey the reasons courts have relied on to deny recovery




56. Ochao, 703 P.2d at 6-9.
57. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1980).
58. Id. at 814-15.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 820-21.
61. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc., 958 F.2d 36,38-39 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia and
WestVirginia law); Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271,274 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying
Pennsylvania law); In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1568-70 (D. Haw. 1990)
(applying Hawaii law); Amendola v. Kans. City So. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401, 1410 (W.D. Mo.
1988) (applying FELA); Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28,31-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);
Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); In re Asbestos Litig. Leary Trial
Group, Nos. 87C-09-24, 90C-09-79, 88C-09-78, 1994 WL 721763 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 14,
1994); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Capital
Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171,
174 (Mass. 1982); Simmons v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp., 674 A.2d 232,237 (Pa. 1996); see also
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993) (en bane) (no recovery for fear
of cancer in a negligence action unless plaintiff is "more likely than not" to develop cancer).
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B. What Courts Have Done in Response to Preinjury Toxic Exposure Claims
for Mental Distress
1. Utilizing Existing Doctrine to Deny Recovery
A significant number of courts that limit recovery for negligent infliction of
mental distress to cases where the plaintiff has suffered either a physical impact or
physical injury have denied recovery for mental distress arising from asymptomatic
pleural thickening on the ground that exposures to toxics that do not bring with
them symptoms of disease do not constitute sufficient "impact" or "physical injury"
to bring them within the rules allowing recovery.62 The most celebrated case taking
this position is Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 3 a recent United States
Supreme Court decision. In an action brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act" (FELA), a plaintiff who had been employed as a pipe-fitter by the
Metro-North Railroad sought recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress
arising from his exposure to asbestos dust over a period of three years.65 In an
earlier case, the Court had held that FELA allows recovery for negligent infliction
of mental distress only by "those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical
harm by that conduct., 66 Plaintiff contended that his long-term exposure to the
asbestos dust that infiltrated his lungs was a sufficient "physical impact" to bring
him within the scope of the traditional rule allowing recovery for mental distress.'
The Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on a large body of common law decisions
that refuse asymptomatic plaintiffs recovery for negligent infliction of mental
distress, 6 the Court held that even long-term exposure to asbestos, absent symptoms
of disease from that exposure, does not qualify as a physical impact and denied
plaintiff recovery.69
62. See, e.g., Burns, 752 P.2d at 31-32; Temple-Inland Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88,
93 (Tex. 1999).
63. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
64. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
65. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 427.
66. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1994).
67. Metro-North, 521 U.S. 428-30.
68. Id. at 431.
69. Id. at 432-38. Although the Court specifically addressed the issue of a plaintiff who was
exposed to asbestos and had manifested no physical changes in his lungs, it is clear that a FELA action
for mental distress cannot be predicated on asymptomatic pleural plaque or thickening. At several
points, the Court noted that it would not allow an action for mental distress to plaintiffs who are
"disease and symptom free." Id. at 432. More importantly, the policy reasons cited by the court for
denying mental distress recovery for those exposed to asbestos apply equally to plaintiffs who have
developed some "trivial" physical change in their bodies. Id. at 433.
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2. Creating New Doctrine to Deny Recovery
Several courts have gone beyond existing rules to deny plaintiffs' claims of
mental distress. In an early case, Eagle-Picher Industries v. Cox, plaintiff, who had
developed asbestosis, sought damages for an increased risk of developing cancer
and for his present fear that he would develop cancer in the future. In its rejection
of the single-action rule, the court found that asbestosis and mesothelioma are
separate diseases.71 Having decided that the asbestos litigation required a departure
from the traditional single-action rule, the court tumed to the plaintiffs claim that
he should be entitled to mental distress damages arising from his current fear of
developing cancer in the future. The court first set forth the Florida rules governing
negligent infliction of mental distress.72 In Florida, the right to recover depends on
whether the plaintiff suffers "a physical impact from an external force."'73 When
there has been such an impact, the plaintiff may recover for mental distress arising
from that impact without any manifestation of physical injury.74 In the absence of
physical impact, plaintiff cannot recover unless the mental distress causes physical
injury.7" Although several courts had held that the ingestion of harmful chemicals
or drugs does not constitute an impact7 6 the Florida court found that the embedding
of asbestos fibers in the plaintiffs lungs qualified as an external physical impact
even though the effects were not immediately deleterious.77
One would have thought that, once the court decided that the lodging of
asbestos fibers in the lungs constitutes an external impact, the court would have
simply endorsed the right for all plaintiffs who could prove inhalation of asbestos
fibers into their lungs to recover for emotional distress without proof of physical
injury. But such was not the case. Instead, the court undertook a separate inquiry
as to whether and when it should allow recovery for fear of cancer.7" It found that
fear of cancer claims are genuine since the plaintiff lives with the sword of
Damocles over his head.79 But it then observed that "[i]f Damocles supplies the
reason for permitting recovery, Pandora supplies the reason for at least limiting
recovery.""0 The court then stated that it would recognize recovery for mental
distress in fear of cancer cases only when the plaintiff had suffered physical injury
as a result of exposure to asbestos."1 In the case before the court, the plaintiff had
70. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
71. Id. at 522.
72. Id. at 526.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)).
75. Id. (citing Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1985)).
76. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 526 (citing Plummer v. Abbot Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920, 927
(D.R.I. 1983); Pazo v. Upjohn Co., 310 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 527.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 528-29.
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developed asbestosis and thus suffered real physical harm." Asbestosis, though
non-malignant, is characterized by such symptoms as shortness of breath, dry
cough, weight loss, and chest pain.8" The court justified allowing recovery for
mental distress because it believed that those who contract asbestosis have a well-
founded reason to fear that they will contract cancer.8 4 The court noted that fifteen
percent of those who develop asbestosis will develop cancer.85 Furthermore, the
asbestosis sufferer faced with "a chronic, painful and concrete reminder that he has
been injuriously exposed to a substantial amount of asbestos, a reminder which may
both qualitatively and quantitatively intensify his fear,' '8 6 thus has a bona fide claim
for mental distress.
Under the reasoning of Eagle-Picher, an asymptomatic plaintiff with only
pleural thickening is in no position factually to anger that he has a significantly
increased risk of developing cancer or that he is suffering current pain that serves
as a constant reminder that a more serious disease may come upon him. His
likelihood of developing cancer is minuscule,87 and he does not face the daily
reminder of such fear in the form of any physical discomfort whatsoever.8 8 The
Eagle-Picher court said that requiring a physical injury as a predicate to recovery
for mental distress was "both necessary and fair." '89 Permitting an action for fear of
cancer where there has been no physical injury from the asbestos "would likely
devastate the court system as well as the defendant manufacturers."9
In a case of singular importance, Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., the
California Supreme Court confronted the problem of liability for negligent infliction
of emotional distress based on the fear of developing cancer from exposure to a
toxic substance.9 The claimants in Potter were property owners living adjacent to
a landfill into which the defendant Firestone had dumped a host of chemicals
known to be human carcinogens.92 These chemicals found their way into wells that
provided the plaintiffs with drinking water.93 Plaintiffs alleged physical symptoms
which they attributed to the toxic chemicals in the water and also claimed damages
for present mental distress arising from fear that they would develop cancer in the
future.94 The trial court found that "it was 'not possible to demonstrate with
sufficient certainty a causal connection between these symptoms and well water
contamination."'9 5 Nonetheless, the trialcourt awarded the plaintiffs $800,000 for
82. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 519.
83. See supra note 2.
84. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 528.
85. Id. at 522.
86. Id. at 529.
87. See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 2.
89. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 528.
90. Id.
91. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 863 P.2d 795, 802 (Cal. 1993).
92. Id. at 801-02
93. Id. at 802.
94. Id. at 803.
95. Id.
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their lifelong fear of cancer and the resultant mental distress.96
California is one of a handful of states allowing recovery for negligent
infliction of mental distress even absent physical injury or harm arising from the
mental distress.97 Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court reversedthe award for
mental distress damages, holding that in the absence of present physical injury,
plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances couldrecover formental distress based onthe
fear of developing cancer in the future only if "future physical injury or illness is
more likely than not to occur as a direct result of the defendant's conduct." 9 The
California Supreme Court declined to express an opinion as to whether cellular
changes in a plaintiff s body would constitute physical injury that would trigger
parasitic damages for mental distress.99 However, what is significant is that the
court recognized that emotional distress toxic tort cases require special treatment
and cannot be subsumed under the general rules for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
C. Why the OverwhelmingMajority of Courts Have Rejected MentalDistress
Recovery for Preinjury Asymptomatic Asbestos Plaintiffs
Utilizing a variety of limited-duty rules, the courts have denied asymptomatic
asbestos plaintiffs recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress. Whether by
declaring that asbestos infiltration into the body does not constitute a physical
impact, by finding that pleural plaque or thickening is not a sufficient physical
injury, orby creating separate rules for fear-of-cancer cases when the fear is caused
by exposure to a toxic substance, courts have found ways to deny recovery. The
formal contours ofthe mental distress limited-duty rules provide no insurmountable
obstacles to recovery. Courts could just as easily have concluded that exposure to
asbestos constitutes a physical impact to the body ' or that pleural thickening
qualifies as a physical injury.10' Most courts have not so concluded because they
view the imposition of such liability as unwise. No single reason predominates.
Courts and commentators have identified a host of policy concerns for denying
these mental distress claims.
1. These Mental Distress Claims Are Significantly Different From
Traditional Emotional Distress Claims
Plaintiffs seeking recovery for mental distress generally allege that
asymptomatic plaintiffs who have developed some pleural thickening are five times
96. Id.
97. The Potter decision contains an extensive discussion of California law that allows recovery
for mental distress without requiring proof of physical injury. Potter, 863 P.2dat 808-10.
98. Id. at 807.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
101. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986).
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more likely to contract cancer 2 and 300 times more likely to develop
mesothelioma than had they not been exposed to asbestos.1 13 Defendants argue that
mere citation of the statistics that indicate the greater likelihood of contracting
cancer or mesothelioma without assessing the baseline risk of cancer in the general
population is highly misleading. "4Where the baseline risk is very low, even a very
high multiple can result in a very small likelihood that an asymptomatic plaintiff
will ever develop lung cancer or mesothelioma. For example, the baseline risk of
lung cancer in the general population is approximately 10 out of 100,000.'0 5 The
increased risk for a plaintiff with pleural thickening is five times the general risk or
50 out of 100,000.106 Thus, the annual risk of a plaintiff developing cancer is 1/20
of 1%.17 The baseline risk of developing non-asbestos related mesothelioma is
infinitesimal. The annual risk to an asymptomatic plaintiff who was exposed to
asbestos is 1/32 of 1%.108
No technologically advanced society can realistically consider compensating
for mental distress when the likelihood of contracting cancer or mesothelioma is so
remote.0 9 Pollutants of all sorts fill the air. Regularly we learn through the media
that these pollutants are potential carcinogens and that they increase the risk of
102. See Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 233 (Pa. 1996).
103. See id. at 233-34.




108. See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 234 n.1; see also In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp.
1563, 1570 n.10 (D. Haw. 1970) (citing study that evidence of lung cancer among shipyard workers
would be approximately sixty seven per million men per year); Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v.
Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1999) (noting that plaintiffs' risk of cancer increased one percent.)
Notably, Temple-Inland left open the question ofwhether one who suffered from an asbestos related-
disease might recover for the fear of developing another more serious asbestos-related disease.
Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 94. However, inPustejovsky, decided one year later, the court intimated
that it would not allow recovery for mental distress in this setting. Pustejovsky v. Rapid Am. Corp.,
35 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. 2000).
It should be noted that scientific opinion is divided. Although exposure to asbestos increases the
risk of cancer, some studies conclude that "there is no evidence of an increased risk in subjects with
pleural plaques compared with subjects without plaques but an equivalent asbestos exposure." E.
Chailleux & M. Letourneux, Impact midical du dipistage des ldsions pleurales binignes liges 6
l'inhalation depoussijres d'aminante, 16 MALADIjES RESPIRATOIRES 1286, 1286 (1999). See also C.
Peacock et al., Asbestos-Related Benign Pleural Disease, 55 CLINICAL RADIALOGY 422, 425 (2000)
(stating that there is no evidence that pleural plaques undergo malignant degeneration into
mesothelioma).
109. See, e.g., Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 91 (refusing to recognize an action for mental
distress arising from exposure to asbestos). The court quoted City of Tyler v. Likes:
Without intent or malice on the defendant's part, serious bodily injury to the
plaintiff, or a special relationship between the two parties, we permit recovery
for mental anguish in only a few types of cases involving injuries of such a
shocking and disturbing nature that mental anguish is a highly foreseeable result.
Id. at 92 (quoting City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 1997)).
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developing cancer."' Having been exposed to them, they are part of our physical
makeup and may lie dormant for decades. The notion that tort law should provide
recovery for tiny increments in risk has no traditional basis in the law of torts.
In an earlier discussion, we set forth the rules that generally govern the tort of
negligent infliction of mental distress.' All of the traditional cases allowing
recovery for emotional distress are characterized by a discrete event that brought
about a serious and clearly identifiable immediate emotional response that radically
altered the emotional well-being ofthe plaintiff. One simply cannot project from the
traditional emotional distress cases a right of recovery for asymptomatic plaintiffs
who have an annualized 1/20 of 1% chance of developing cancer. The law has not
and should not seek to protect the right to be free from general malaise arising from
some small increase in the background risk of contracting cancer. Even courts that
advocate recovery for pure mental distress absent physical harm do so only in cases
that are light years removed from the claims of mental distress alleged by
asymptomatic plaintiffs in the asbestos cases.
2. Remote-Risk Cases Present Serious Problems in Separating
Meritorious From Non-meritorious Claims
Putting aside the question of whether asbestos mental distress claims are
inherently valid, courts have expressed deep concern about their ability to
distinguish meritorious claims from those that are trivial. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Metro-North, asbestos is only one of a smorgasbord of
I 10. See Potterv. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,811-12 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). The
court noted:
As a starting point in our analysis, we recognize the indisputable fact that
all of us are exposed to carcinogens every day. As one commentator has
observed, "[i]t is difficultto go aweek withoutnews of toxic exposure. Virtually
everyone in society is conscious of the fact that the air they breathe, water, food
and drugs they ingest, land on which they live, or products to which they are
exposed are potential health hazards. Although few are exposed to all, few also
can escape exposure to any."
Id. (quoting Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A
Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 527, 576 (1984) (footnotes omitted)). See also
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, where the Court made a similar observation:
[Contacts, even extensive contacts, with serious carcinogens are common. See,
e.g., Nicholson, Perkel & Selikoff, Occupational Exposure to Asbestos:
Population at Risk and Projected Mortality-1980-2030, 3 Am. J. Indust. Med.
259 (1982) (estimating that 21 million Americans have been exposed to work-
related asbestos); U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1 Seventh Annual
Report on Carcinogens 71 (1994) (3 million workers exposed to benzene, a
majority of Americans exposed outside the workplace); Pirkle, et al., Exposure
oftheU.S. Populationto Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 275 JAMA 1233,1237
(1996) (reporting that 43% of American children lived in a home with at least
one smoker, and 37% of adult nonsmokers lived in a home with at least one
smoker or reported environmental tobacco smoke at work).
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,434-35 (1997).
111. See supra Part HL.A.
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toxic pollutants that are potential carcinogens to which we are daily exposed. 12 Are
courts capable of deciding the emotional distress created by the "increased risk of
dying" for each carcinogen? Justice Breyer puts it well:
An external circumstance-exposure-makes some emotional
distress more likely. But how can one determine from the external
circumstance of exposure whether, or when, a claimed strong
emotional reaction to an increased mortality risk (say from 23%
to 28%) is reasonable and genuine, rather than
overstated-particularly when the relevant statistics themselves
are controversial and uncertain (as is usually the case), and
particularly since neither those exposed nor judges or juries are
experts in statistics? The evaluation problem seems a serious
one. 
1 13
3. Allowing Recovery for Mental Distress Gives Precedence to Those
Less Seriously Injured
Almost every judge and scholar who has addressed the issue of recovery for
mental distress arising from exposure to asbestos has noted the irony that the huge
volume of mental distress claims can devour the assets of defendants at the expense
of more seriously injured plaintiffs." 4 All plaintiffs exposed to asbestos have
potential immediate mental distress claims. Asbestosis and mesothelioma have very
long latency periods. When plaintiffs actually develop these serious diseases for
which they are clearly entitled to compensation, they may find that there are no
assets left to compensate them for their injuries." 5 To place claims of doubtful
112. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 434.
113. Id. at 435.
114. See, e.g., Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 435-36; Potter, 863 P.2d at 814; Temple-Inland Forest
Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex. 1999); see also Mark A. Behrens & Monica G.
Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket
Programs, 33 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1 (2001). The landmark article describing this problem is Peter H.
Schuck's The Worst Should Go First. See Schuck, supra note 1.
115. See Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage ofJustice, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 155,
155. Parloff states:
Becauseof the dwindling number ofplausible, solventasbestos defendants,
tension has built between the firms that represent only very sick plaintiffs, like
Steve Kazan's, and larger firms that represent all plaintiffs, including the
unimpaireds. "I happen to believe," says Kazan, "that the interests of the
unimpaired clients in fact are better served by giving them nothing or very little
now, but making sure that if they were to get sick later on there will be money
for them."
In February 2000, when the most recent waive of bankruptcies began,
Kazan and others with practices like his decided that their clients' interests could
no longer be adequately protected by plaintiffs creditors' committees composed
predominantly of lawyers like Baron [who represents both injured and
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validity ahead of serious injury claims because the former are by definition first in
time is simply unjust. No one has a good word to say about this practice. In several
jurisdictions where plaintiffs legitimately fear that failure to bring immediate action
may mean that they will later be barred by the statute of limitations if they develop
asbestosis or an asbestos related malignancy, courts have established inactive
docket plans.' 6 Under these plans, plaintiffs who have asymptomatic pleural
thickening are listed in a pleural registry, and their claims are deferred until they
suffer true physical impairment.! 7 The statute of limitations is tolled and discovery
is stayed until objective evidence of physical impairment is forthcoming. 8 The net
effect of such plans is to disallow recovery for mental distress based on the fear of
developing more serious asbestos-related diseases in the future."9
4. Mental Distress Claims Against Second Generation Asbestos
Defendants are Manifestly Unfair
When considering the validity of mental distress claims for asymptomatic
plaintiffs, one must take into account the impact of such causes of action against the
second generation of "peripheral" asbestos defendants. These defendants are not
manufacturers of asbestos, but are, for the most part, companies that purchased
asbestos for use as a component in a larger general product. Automobile and truck
manufacturers who used asbestos in brake linings and boiler manufacturers who
used asbestos as an insulator are recent examples of this new generation of
peripheral defendants"0 who have been targeted once the prime defendants-the
asbestos companies-have been driven into bankruptcy and are no longer a source
of funds to compensate asbestos plaintiffs.
To understand the injustice of allowing an action for mental distress on behalf
of asymptomatic plaintiffs against the second generation of asbestos defendants, it
is necessary to provide some context for this cause of action. Actions brought
against asbestos manufacturers on behalf of plaintiffs who have contracted
asbestosis or mesothelioma have the greatest claim to validity. Manufacturers who,
because of their expertise, either knew or should have known of the dangers
associated with exposure to asbestos may face legitimate negligence claims for
failure to warn of the risks of harm. When such negligence results in physical
injury, the plaintiff has a claim for traditional tort damages. As we have seen, if the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate illness or disease and claims only mental distress, the
courts generally deny recovery for the reasons set forth above.' On the other hand,
unimpaired plaintiffs]. They formed a committee of their own to make sure that
their point of view would be heard.
Id. at 170.
116. See Behrens & Parham, supra note 114, at 13-16.
117. See id. at 8-9.
118. See id. at 8.
119. See id. at 18.
120. See Parloff, supra note 115, at 162.
121. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
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cases brought against the non-manufacturer second generation "peripheral"
defendants are of questionable validity. These defendants had neither the expertise
nor the access to research and data that characterize the claims against defendant
manufacturers." Even if claims against these defendants are facially valid, they
represent fault different not only in degree, but in kind, from that alleged against
asbestos manufacturers. Whether such tenuous fault should support recovery for
injuries such as asbestosis or mesothelioma canbe debated. But what clearly should
be beyond the pale is allowing a claim based on tenuous fault to support a cause of
action for suspect mental distress damages.
Courts that are considering whether to allow recovery for mental distress for
asymptomatic plaintiffs against manufacturers should be aware that such an action,
once recognized, will be utilized against second, third, and fourth generation
defendants whose fault, if any, is marginal. Ideally, tort law, through the medium
of proximate cause, is supposed to deny recovery when harm is wildly
disproportional to fault. 23 As a practical matter, case by case proximate cause
determinations cannot be managed in the context of the huge volume of asbestos
cases. Claims based on marginal fault that result in damages based on fear created
by tiny increments of increased risk will come to dominate the asbestos litigation
scene. The madness must come to an end.
V. WHERE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE SUPERFICIALLY PLAUSIBLE AND TRADITION
IS NONEXISTENT: RECOVERY FOR MEDICAL MONITORING
A. Why Medical Monitoring Claims Are Superficially Plausible, if Not
Downright Appealing
As earlier discussions make clear, claims for increased risk are manifestly
implausible because no good reason exists for allowing unimpaired plaintiffs to
pursue recovery prematurely, based on inherently speculative claims about future
possibilities, when they will most assuredly be allowed to come into court later if
and when they actually suffer injury.'24 Quite simply, speculative claims for future
injuries should be deferred to such a time when certainty replaces speculation. And
while claims for mental anguish caused by increased risk are comparatively more
plausible-the mental anguish represents a current, not a future, injury--strong
traditions in Anglo-American law cut against allowing such claims for intangible
losses in the absence of physical impact or injury.' In contrast, claims for medical
monitoring appear to combine currency and tangibility. A plaintiff exposed to
asbestos or other toxic substances may argue that she requires surveillance quite
122. See Informational Brief of Babcock & Wilcox Co. at 3-12, In re The Babcock & Wilcox
Co. (Bankr. E.D. La. filed Feb. 22, 2000) (No. 00-10992).
123. See generally DOBBS, supra note 17, §§ 180-86.
124. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text
125. See supra notes 62-113 and accompanying text
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independently of whether she eventually suffers injury."6 Furthermore, medical
monitoring is designed to commence immediately, in the physical world, and its
economic costs are demonstrably real and calculable. Indeed, the costs of medical
surveillance resemble, at least superficially, the costs of medical treatment for
tortiously-caused physical injury, which courts have properly recognized since our
tort system began. 27 As shall be made clear, this apparent similarity masks
important differences between medical treatment for actual injuries and medical
monitoring for the possibility of future injuries.' 28 But, it helps to explain why
exposure-based medical monitoring claims are superficially attractive.
Another reason for the intuitive appeal of medical monitoring claims is that
asbestos and other toxic substances have come to epitomize the evils of ruthless
industrial technology in the public eye,'" and the plaintiffs are quintessentially
innocent victims of wrongdoing."'3 In this setting of heightened sensitivities, if not
passions, the plaintiffs may come to be seen in the collective judicial mind as
analogous to beleaguered victims of natural disasters, seeking funding for public
health programs aimed at preventing future outbreaks of disease. 3 ' On the other
hand, plaintiffs seeking to recover for alleged emotional upset following exposure
to asbestos may appear to be overreaching, looking for a monetary windfall after
the event.'32 But who can doubt the motives of plaintiffs who seek merely the
opportunity to undergo unpleasant, often invasive medical examinations to attempt
to detect the early onset of disease? Claims for mental anguish are inherently
suspect; claims for medical monitoring, by contrast, seem justified. It follows that
even ifa substantial portion of what defendants are required to spend on monitoring
does not actually redress a significant social problem, these liabilities are believed
to be warranted because they respond to wrongdoing in a symbolically satisfying
manner.
126. See, e.g., Betts v. Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1218 (111. App.
Ct. 1992) ("Here, the incurring of medical expenses for future monitoring of plaintiffs' conditions is
reasonably certain to occur, although the contracting of cancer is not.").
127. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ETAL., THE TORTs PRocEss 615-629 (5th ed. 1999).
128. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
129. Even in the context of the recent World Trade Center tragedy, the media raised the spectre
of asbestos contamination. See, e.g., Tracy Watson, Uncertainty Surrounds Asbestos, U.S.A. TODAY,
Feb. 7, 2002, at 6A; David France & Erika Check, Asbestos Alert, NEWSWEEK, at
http:/wwv.newsweek.com (Sept. 14, 2001).
130. See, e.g., Eric Planin & Michael A. Fletcher, Many Schools Built Near Toxic Sites, Study
Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2002, at A2 (reporting that hundreds of thousands of children throughout
the country attend schools built near toxic sites and are thereby endangered); cf. infra note 178 and
accompanying text.
131. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W.Va. 1999) ("[T]here is
an important public health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose
exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease .... (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993))).
132. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 434,435 (1997) ("[H]ow can
one determine from the external circumstance of exposure whether ... a claimed strong emotional
reaction... is reasonable and genuine, rather than overstated... ?").
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To these admittedly impressionistic observations may be added another
explanation for the superficial appeal of medical monitoring claims-one rooted in
the judicial decisions allowing recovery. Awarding preinjury plaintiffs exposed to
asbestos and other toxic substances the costs of medical monitoring may serve as
something of a consolation prize, helping to soften the negative impact of judicial
rejection of the same plaintiffs' claims increased risk and mental anguish.'33 The
pattern repeats itself in the reported decisions. Plaintiffs alleging exposure to
asbestos or other toxic substances, without any resulting physical injury, come
before courts asserting claims for relief on the three bases being examined in this
Article. The judges fairly routinely reject their claims for increased risk and mental
anguish, for the reasons outlined earlier, impliedly admonishing the plaintiffs for
having imagined that relief might be forthcoming in the absence of physical
injury.' However, these same judges, when they address the claims for medical
monitoring, reverse direction and take pains to explain why this third basis of
liability does not raise the same concerns as did the first and second. 3' On a fair
reading of these decisions, one gets the impression that the medical monitoring
claims provide judges with an opportunity to give the plaintiffs something, without
seeming to break totally with the traditional requirement that negligence plaintiffs
demonstrate tangible physical harm. In this respect, allowing recovery for medical
monitoring may seem to judges like the least they can do for plaintiffs placed at
increased risk by modem technology.
B. The Case Law to Date Is Mixed, Leaning Toward Acceptance but With
Recent Signs of Stiffening Resistance
Published judicial opinions began to focus on medical monitoring in the early
to mid-1980s, with judicial attention increasing steadily since then. The earliest
cases involved classic examples of traumatic impacts and physical injuries in which
the plaintiffs sought to recover for the future costs of continued medical
surveillance.'36 The medical monitoring aspects of these cases were consistent with
traditional remedies for negligence-based tort recovery, and they cannot be said to
133. See generally Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedyfor Deserving
Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 521, 521
(2000) ("With its lower standards of proof, a medical monitoring award often represents plaintiffs'
strongest chance of success.").
134. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 29, 32 (Ariz. Ct. App.1987) ("The
psychosomatic injuries diagnosed by Dr. Gray... are not the type of bodily harm which would sustain
a cause of action for emotional distress.").
135. Id. at 33 ("[D]espite the absence of physical manifestations of any asbestos-related
diseases... the plaintiffs should be entitled (to recover the costs of medical monitoring].").
136. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1986)
(involving plaintiff who was soaked in cacogenic chemicals); Friends For All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816,818 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (involving a flying accident which killed
and injured hundreds of orphans).
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have broken new ground. ' The seminal decision allowing recovery for medical
monitoring in the absence of traumatic impact or manifested physical injury is
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, decided in 1987.138 In that case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a group of plaintiffs who had been exposed to a toxin in
their residential drinking water could recover medical surveillance costs from their
municipality, which was found responsible for their predicament. 139 TheAyers court
held that the plaintiffs, none of whom had developed symptoms ofexposure-related
disease, could recover medical monitoring expenses if such monitoring were found
to be reasonably necessary in light of five articulated criteria.14 In so holding, the
court relied on earlier decisions involving traumatic impacts and physical injuries,
and purported merely to be countenancing the extension of a traditional remedy for
a traditional tort.'4' Over the next several years other courts, relying on Ayers,
allowed recovery for medical monitoring in cases involving persons who, having
been exposed to toxics substances, had not yet manifested physical injuries. 42 For
example, in In re Paoli R. R. Yard PCB Litigation, decided in 1990, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, recognized medical
monitoring claims. 43 The Paoli opinion sets forth four prerequisites to recovery that
have played a role in guiding subsequent developments.' 44 To date, courts in about
twenty jurisdictions, including the highest courts in at least seven states, purport to
recognize these claims.145 Several academic commentators have approved of these
developments.'" Some of these commentators, including the author of a recent law
137. See Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 6 (1998)
(noting that Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., the seminal case involving
traumatic impacts of an airplane crash, broke no new ground in allowing medical surveillance claims).
138. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
139. See id. at312-13.
140. Seeid. at312.
141. See id. at 311 ("Compensation for reasonable andnecessary medical expenses is consistent
with well-accepted legal principles.").
142. See, e.g., Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Hansen
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970,978-82 (Utah 1993). See generally Klein, supra note 137,
at 9-10.
143. In re PaoliR.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829,852 (3rd Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania
law).
144. See id. Other courts have adopted these criteria. See, e.g., In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 265
F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2001).
145. See THOMAS M. GoUTMAN, MEDICAL MoNrroRiNG: How BAD SCIENCE MAKES BAD LAW
39-55 (2001) (listing states that recognize medical monitoring claims).
146. See, e.g., Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment
of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 716
(1992); Linda A. Elfenbein, Note, Future Medical Surveillance: An Award for Toxic Tort Victims,
38 RUTGERS L. REv. 795, 811 (1986); Leslie S. Gara, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using
Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12
HARv. ENVT'.L. REv. 265, 303-04 (1988); Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages:
A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849, 851 (1988); Paul
J. Komyatte, Medical MonitoringDamages: An Evolution ofEnvironmental TortLaw, 23 COLO.LAW.
1533, 1534-35 (1994). But see George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and
Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 227, 283
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review article that may prove to be influential, 4 7 explicitly base their analysis on
the fact that allowing recovery in these cases does not represent a new cause of
action but merely the recognition of an evolving remedy for a traditional tort.'4
What makes medical monitoring interesting from a precedential standpoint is
the fact that at least four courts-including the United States Supreme Court-have
rejected medical monitoring claims in the last several years. In Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, the United States Supreme Court considered these
developments and rejected medical monitoring claims under FELA as unwise and
uncalled for. 49 The soundness of this conclusion will be considered in a subsequent
discussion in this Article.50 Suffice it to say that Justice Breyer's majority opinion
penetrates the superficial appeal described earlier and finds the claims to lack
sufficient substantive merit to warrant their recognition in FELA cases.'
Moreover, within the last year, supreme courts in two states-Nevada'5 2 and
Alabama' -have rejected medical monitoring claims in the absence of physical
injury. The most recent decision rejecting medical monitoring claims is Duncan v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., in which the federal district court, applying Washington
law, held that no cause of action exists to recover the costs of medical monitoring. "
Referring to such claims as "a novel, nontraditional tort and remedy,"'55 the district
court noted that "[m]ost of the states that have considered the issue have chosen to
recognize a remedy rather than create a separate, new cause of action."'56 The court
concluded that, under Washington law, the plaintiff could pursue medical
monitoring as part of her claim to recover for existing injury, but could not pursue
that claim independent of such injury.'57
Importantly, these decisions rejecting preinjury medical monitoring recovery
support the conclusion that the case law is mixed regarding whether medical
monitoring claims should be allowed where personal injury is not present. A
majority of the relevant decisions to date recognize such claims, although a number
of these jurisdictions insist that no new cause of action-rather, only a question of
(1993).
147. See Klein, supra note 137, at 10-11.
148. See supra note 146.
149. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 443-44 (1997).
150. See infra Part V.C.
151. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 438-44.
152. See Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435,441 (Nev. 2001).
153. See Hinton v. Monsanto Co., No. 1000599,2001 WL 1073699 at *4 (Ala. Sept. 14,2001).
154. Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 608-09 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("In light
of Washington's hesitation to recognize new torts, its reluctance to allow damages for enhanced risk
without an accompanying present injury, and the ambiguity in case law from other states, this Court
holds that there is no cause of action for medical monitoring as an independent tort under Washington
law.").
155. Id. at 607.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 609.
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remedy-is involved.15 But at least four courts, including the United States
Supreme Court and the highest courts of two states, have rejected this position.'
On any fair assessment of the relevant precedent, American courts have not reached
consensus regarding the legitimacy of these medical monitoring claims. The
question remains unanswered, to be considered on the merits.
C. On the Merits: Recovery in TortforPreinjury MedicalMonitoring Claims
Should Be Rejected
1. ClearingAway the Underbrush: The Issue Is Substantive, Not Merely
Remedial
As the foregoing discussion of legal precedent makes clear, many courts and
commentators who support medical monitoring claims insist that the issue is
whether to allow a somewhat novel remedy (some even dispute the novelty of the
remedy) in the context of a traditional, mainstream tort.1 60 These courts and
commentators assert that nothing really new is happening substantively if a court
imposes medical monitoring liability on a defendant when the plaintiff has not yet
manifested physical injury. Regardless of whether recovery should be allowed in
these cases, characterizing the issue as essentially remedial is wrong. The view that
medical monitoring involves nothing new rests, explicitly or implicitly, on the
questionable premise that the plaintiffs in these cases have been "injured"--that
their exposures to asbestos and other toxins have placed them at greater risk of
future injury, and that this fact of increased risk, or the fact of the exposure itself,
constitutes an "injury"similar to a broken leg suffered in an automobile accident."
Simply stated, this premise is false. From the beginnings of our negligence
158. See Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435,440 (Nev. 2001) ("Courts have recognized
medical monitoring more often as a remedy than as a cause of action.").
159. See supra notes 149-57; see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring-Should
Tort Law Say Yes?, 34WAK FOREST L. REv. 1057, 1074 (1999).
160. See supra notes 141, 148, 158 and accompanying text.
161. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424,430 (W.Va. 1999). The court
held: "We now reject the contention that a claim for future medical expenses must rest upon the
existence of present physical harm. The 'injury' that underlies a claim for medical monitoring-just
as with any other cause of action sounding in tort-is 'the invasion of any legally protected interest.'
Id. (quoting RSTATEmENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 7(1) (1965)). The court then quoted the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one of the first courts to grapple with this
subject:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical
injury. When a defendant negligently invades this interest, the injury to which
is neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the defendant
should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the examinations.
Id. (quoting Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir.
1984). For a helpful explanation of how flexible the concept of "injury" can be in this context, see
Matthew D. Hamrick, Comment Theories of Injury and Recovery for Post-Exposure, Pre-Symptom
Plaintiffs: The Supreme Court Takes a Critical Look, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 461,468-85 (1999).
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jurisprudence, "injury" has been synonymous with "harm" and connotes physical
impairment or dysfunction, or mental upset, pain and suffering resulting from such
harm. 62 This definition is not drily logical; it serves as a linchpin in determining the
duties of care owed by defendants and both the validity and timeliness of plaintiffs'
claims for fault-based recovery.'63
As explained earlier, a great majority of American courts have rejected
exposure-based claims to recover for increased risk of future injury in the absence
of current injury."4 It follows that judicial and academic commentary categorizing
medical monitoring claims as merely a question of appropriate remedy or
measurement of recovery serves as an analytical smoke screen to hide the fact that
a substantive departure from tradition is being implemented. It may turn out that
recognizing these claims makes sense in light of the relevant policy considerations.
But the "only remedies are involved" rhetoric represents analytical underbrush that
must be cleared away before the substantive policy issues can be addressed on the
merits. The substantive question to be answered is this: Should courts allow
plaintiffs to recover based on the possibility of future injuries by imposing on
defendants the current costs of medically monitoring those persons placed at
increased risk? Framing the question in this manner makes clarifies what many
advocates of recovery for medical monitoring seek to obfuscate: that to recognize
these claims is to allow current recovery in the absence of current injury. A
reasonable court might choose to allow these claims; but such a decision would be
neither "only remedial" nor "business as usual."
2. The Arguments in Support ofRecovery for Medical Monitoring Tend
to Beg the Questions of Whether Plaintiffs Have Suffered Injury and
Whether the Claims Could Be Fairly Adjudicated
A recent Supreme Court of West Virginia decision, Bower v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,65 relying on an earlier California Supreme Court decision, 66
outlines four public policy considerations that favor recognizing a right to recover
medical monitoring costs: (1) allowing recovery serves "an important public health
interest in fostering access to medical testing," especially in light of the value of
early diagnosis and treatment for insidious diseases such as cancer;' 67 (2)
recognizing these claims promotes deterrence by discouraging the irresponsible
162. Section 282 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as conduct "which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Section 7 defines "harm" as denoting "the
existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person." Id. at § 7(1).
163. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1272 (2001)
(noting that historically, "the evil against which tort law was directed was the doing of harm, rather
than the infringement of rights or the violation of duties").
164. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
165. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
166. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
167. See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431.
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distribution of toxic substances;' 68 (3) early monitoring may prevent or mitigate
future illnesses and thus reduce the eventual liability costs to the defendants; 69 and
(4) allowing recovery serves "societal notions of fairness and elemental justice" by
assuring that plaintiffs "wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxins," but unable to
prove that cancer or other disease is likely, may recover when medical surveillance
is shown to be reasonable and necessary. 7a The West Virginia Supreme Court
concluded that recovery for medical monitoring is appropriate "where it can be
proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to be incurred as a
proximate result of a defendant's tortious conduct."' 7 '
A detailed critique of this reasoning is unnecessary to our purpose.' 2 The
important point here is that the court's policy analysis assumes that courts are
equipped to resolve the issues of proximate causation and measurement to which
the court alluded in its above excerpted conclusion and that the relevant social costs
of medical surveillance are significant. The Bower court's second policy argument
regarding deterrence, for example, is valid only if one assumes that the social costs
of any given exposure to asbestos or other toxic substance can, in the absence of
physical injury, be determined fairly and accurately. However, given the
unavoidable difficulties of measurement and assessment, together with the great
number of claims involved, the possibility of significant overdeterrence is very real
in this context.'73 Additionally, the court's fourth argument-that allowing medical
monitoring claims will provide compensation to plaintiffs who cannot prove that
they have been or are likely to be injured-clearly begs the question of why justice
is necessarily served by allowing, through the back door, recoveries that courts will
not allow in through the front.' 4 In the end, the policy issues that really count are
the ones that the West Virginia Supreme Court's policy analysis' begs: Are courts
institutionally capable of determining the true social costs, in the form of increased
needs for medical surveillance, of public exposures to toxic substances? Are those
social costs substantial enough to warrant inviting massive litigation, involving
potentially millions of exposed plaintiffs, as a kind of judicially-sponsored public





172. For example, the first and third reasons are redundant. The point of substance in both is that
monitoring helps prevent disease, which simultaneously benefits the patients, society, and the
defendants who must pay when disease occurs.
173. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997) (noting that
recoverable costs are difficult to identify and tens of millions of individuals may have suffered
exposure that justifies monitoring); see also Klein, supra note 137, at 27 ("Forcing defendants to
internalize unmatured risk in the nature of medical monitoring expenses... raises serious concerns
of overdeterrence.").
174. See Klein, supra note 137, at 15 ('[E]nhanced risk itself is not compensable, but if you
demonstrate an increased risk of disease, you can recover medical monitoring costs .....
175. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
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3. Powerful Arguments Support Rejection of Recovery for Preinjury
Medical Monitoring
No one has yet advocated for the proposition that tort-based funding of medical
surveillance serves a significant social need. Available evidence strongly suggests
that many, if not most, persons exposed to toxic substances do not want to be
monitored. Obviously, rational persons would like to be paid money "in the name"
of receiving surveillance; but they apparently have a lot better ways to spend the
money than on monitoring, once they receive it.'76 Thus, it is hardly surprising that
many proponents of tort liability insist that recoveries go not to the claimants
directly in money payments, but to fund court-administered programs from which
claimants may benefit only by actually undergoing medical monitoring.
177
Moreover, even if it were somehow possible to determine which monitoring costs
are attributable to which toxic sources, most monitoring systems established to
accomplish marginal improvements would duplicate systems set up for similar
purposes. 178 A large majority of Americans (admittedly not all) are covered by one
form or another of general health insurance which presumably is in place to carry
the lion's part (admittedly not all) of the financial burden of medical monitoring. 79
Even if marginal social benefits were generated by recognizing tort claims for
medical monitoring, they are almost certainly smaller than proponents of tort
recovery anticipate in their arguments. Furthermore, such monitoring--especially
excessive monitoring-is not only wasteful of scarce resources, but often places
those being monitored at risk of surveillance-related harm. 80
But if the social benefits derived from court-sanctioned medical monitoring are
questionable to the point of being dubious, the serious negative impacts of such
liability on the business firms involved cannot be doubted. Given that negligently
distributed or discharged toxins can be perceived to lie around every comer in the
modem industrialized world,' and their effects on risk levels are at best
speculative, the potential tort claims involved are inherently limitless and endless." 2
When courts require plaintiffs to prove that they have been, or are likely to become,
176. See Klein, supra note 137, at 24 ("[F]ew (if any) medical monitoring proponents suggest
that courts award lump-sum damages to plaintiffs, presumably because they fear that plaintiffs will
spend the money on goods and services other than medical surveillance."); see also Maskin et al.,
supra note 133, at 541-42 & nn.101-13 (2000) (describing relevant data on plaintiffs' use of medical
monitoring awards).
177. See Maskin et al., supra note 133, at 543 (advocating limiting recovery to a medical fund);
see also Blumenberg, supra note 146, at 665-66 (explaining the periodic payment approach to
dispersing medical monitoring funds).
178. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 442.
179. Robert Pear, Number of Uninsured Dropsfor 2nd Year, N.Y. TIMEs, September 28, 2001,
at A20 (reporting that 177 million people have employer-sponsored health insurance).
180. See generally GOUTMAN, supra note 145, at 13-16; McCarter, supra note 146, at 276-80.
181. See Klein, supra note 137, at 13-14 & nn.60-61; McCarter, supra note 146, at 245-46 &
n. 102.
182. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 433 (referring to "unlimited and unpredictable liability"); see
generally Maskin et al., supra note 133, at 528-29 & nn. 34-46.
[Vol. 53: 815
ASBESTOS LMGATION GONE MAD
physically injured as a result of exposures to asbestos or other toxic substances,
defendants' potential liabilities are containedwithinnatural boundaries. In contrast,
in the medical monitoring context there are no such natural boundaries. Especially
when medical surveillance is seen as conferring significant public health benefits,
proponents may be hard-pressed to see the need for boundaries. After all, what
could be wrong with having unpopular defendants pay for making America a
healthier place?
The accuracy of these observations regarding potentially crushing liabilities is
revealed by the concern that advocates of medical monitoring liability have
expressed regarding the need to set meaningful requirements that plaintiffs must
meet before imposing such liability. The most often recognized requirements clearly
reflect these concerns. Thus, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Bower adopted
six such prerequisites to medical monitoring liability.'83 These include significant
exposure to "a proven hazardous substance,"'84 creating an increased risk of "a
serious latent disease,"' requiring monitoring that is "different from what would
be prescribed in the absence of the exposure."' 8 6 Observe that the court self-
consciously relied on a series of quantitative modifiers, italicized above, in an effort
to reserve liability for truly deserving cases. Anyone familiar with modem
American trial practice will understand that, however well-meaning, this reliance
on superlatives will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of
fact."8 7 There is no escaping the conclusion that defendants in these medical
monitoring cases face potentially crushing liabilities.'88
Another inescapable implication of the inherent vagueness and open-endedness
of medical monitoring litigation is that the courts will face, in the long run, an
overwhelming flood of litigation in this area.'89 If the past decade of asbestos
litigation has taught us anything, it is that the appetites of the plaintiffs bar know
no limits in the ongoing search for secondary and even tertiary generations of
defendants against whom to bring massive collective actions on new and expanding
legal theories. 9 The West Virginia Supreme Court may believe that it "did justice"
183. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432-33 (W.Va. 1999).
184. Id. (emphasis added) (Elements one and two).
185. Id. (emphasis added) (Element four).
186. Id. (emphasis added) (Element five).
187. All that plaintiffs must do to satisfy the first requirement, for example, is to have their
medical expert testify that the exposure is "significant" and that the substance-e.g., asbestos-is a
"proven" hazard. The disease-cancer, in most instances-is indisputably "serious." Bower's six
prerequisites may make academics feel good, but they should make any competent trial lawyer smile.
188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
189. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433 (1997) (noting that
medical monitoring claims could threaten a "flood" of less important cases).
190. See generally Richard B. Schmitt, How Plaintiffs'Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos Into a
Court Perennial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at Al. The article describes how plaintiffs' lawyers are
bringing actions, including preinjury exposure claims, against everyone who had any
connection-even tangential-with asbestos. For example, MetLife Insurance Company recently
settled asbestos claims based on its having sold group life insurance policies to the employees of
asbestos companies, thereby playing a role as "part of the foundation to put asbestos everywhere." Id.
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in Bower by adopting an ostensibly sensible rule of liability with which lower
courts will be able to render medical monitoring decisions that are fair, rational, and
manageable. But surely Bower has unwittingly brought upon the West Virginia
judiciary the potential for a plague of future litigation of questionable substantive
benefit with which it is institutionally incapable of dealing. Manifestly the Supreme
Court of West Virginia has set upon a course that will prove just as unworkable and
unmanageable as would recognition of the emotional upset claims.' 9' The possible
reasons why the Bower court succumbed to temptation regarding medical
monitoring are explained below.'92 But the institutional costs to the courts in that
state will, almost certainly, be very great.
Finally, it must be understood that judicial recognition of claims for preinjury
medical surveillance threatens the conceptual integrity of the American common
law of torts. When one reflects objectively on what is happening injurisdictions like
West Virginia, at the conceptual level these medical monitoring claims combine
elements of failure to rescue and pure economic loss. In effect, the plaintiffs in these
cases want to force the defendants to pay the purely economic costs of rescuing
them from a medical predicament. In both of these areas of the common law of torts
courts have traditionally proceeded with great caution, perceiving correctly that,
however superficially appealing plaintiffs' claims may appear in the short run, the
open-endedness of robust liability regimes would prove highly problematic in the
long run. 93 In these medical monitoring cases the plaintiffs' predicaments are
allegedly caused by the defendants' wrongful acts in distributing or discharging
asbestos or other toxic substances.'94 But the fact remains that from a legal process
perspective the tasks of sorting out how much of that predicament can fairly be
attributed to defendants' behavior, and what, exactly, to require by way of rescue
efforts, are no less onerous here than in other duty-to-rescue contexts.'95 Moreover,
the conclusion is inescapable that the plaintiffs are seeking to recover pure
economic loss in the absence of either personal injury or property damage.'9 6
Recognizing these claims represents an important conceptual extension that is
obfuscated in the judicial decisions and academic commentary characterizing the
The article quotes a leading plaintiffs' lawyer as saying in a lunchtime interview, "'The asbestos
companies are going bankrupt faster than you and I can eat the food.'... 'We need to find someone
else to pay the victims."' Id.
191. See supra notes 61-123 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Part D.
193. See generally HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 127, at 267-97, 392-409.
194. Thus, technically the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims come within an exception to
the no-duty-to-rescue rule for cases in which the defendant's conduct has created the need for rescue.
See, e.g., Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841, 842-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967) (explaining the no-duty-to-
rescue rule and its exceptions).
195. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REv.
901,901-02 (1982) (arguing that since tort law guides behavior, the restraints it imposes explain much
of its substantive content).
196. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439 (1997) (referring to
medical monitoring costs as "a separate negligently caused economic 'injury"').
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recoveries as being merely remedial in nature. 97
D. Suggestions Regarding Why Courts in Twenty Jurisdictions Have
Recognized Medical Monitoring Claims
To the extent that the preceding analysis may persuade objective readers that
the West Virginia Supreme Court and approximately twenty other jurisdictions' 9s
have erred in recognizing these causes of action, it is interesting to speculate why
this is happening. Part of the answer lies in the earlier discussion of the superficial
attractiveness of these claims. 199 But one might have expected that courts would
have penetrated beyond the surface of first impressions. American courts have
resisted similar temptations in other areas-the rejection of exposure-based claims
for mental anguish is a good example."' Acknowledging the speculative nature of
these musings, the authors suggest that a combination of exogenous factors (factors
outside traditional legal precedents and recognized policy objectives) may have
combined to help persuade a surprising number of courts to allow recovery for
preinjury medical monitoring. We begin with the popular culture surrounding and
presumably influencing judicial behavior. Our modem world, quite literally, is full
of risks of invidious disease from exposure to a host of toxic substances.2"'
Culturally, our tendency is to seize upon a relatively few, often relatively minor
risks from among the many that exist and focus our collective energies on "solving"
those problems. 2 One such risk is the increased risk of cancer from certain selected
contaminants in our living and working environments. Make no mistake-the risk
of contracting cancer in America today is certainly not "minor., 20 3 But much of that
risk is not related to contaminants in the environment;2° and of that part of the
cancer risk that is so related, a substantial portion can fairly be described as
"background" levels of contaminants that have nothing directly to do with the
discharge or distribution of potentially harmful substances by toxic tort
197. See supra notes 141, 148, 158 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 138-45, 165-7.1, and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part V.A.
200. See supra notes 62-113 and accompanying text
201. See supra note 181 and accompanying text
202. SeegenerallyTimurKuran & Cass R. Sunstein,Availability Cascades andRiskRegulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999). The authors define "availability cascades" as self-reinforcing
processes of collective belief formation by which expressed perceptions trigger massive chain
reactions that give those perceptions increasing plausibility. Id. Once started, these cascades of
perceptions can escalate rapidly to dominate the attention of the media. Id. at 685-87. These cascades
can be helpful but they can also prompt regulators, including courts, to implement socially harmful
responses. Id. at 685.
203. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES: 1996 94
(1996) (noting that 23.5% of Americans who died in 1994 died of cancer).
204. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law'
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1984)(citing epidemiological studies
indicating that disease is caused both by specific substances as well as "background risk"). Professor
Rosenberg notes that researches have even associated mesothelioma, which had been "linked
exclusively to asbestos exposure, with exposure to other sources." Id. at 856 n.3 1.
2002]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendants."' One approach to achieving solutions to the toxic tort problem is to
promote ambitious, post-hoc ameliorative programs of some type, including
aggressive medical surveillance, to "heal the wounds."2 6 The authors suspect, but
obviously cannot prove, that courts have been encouraged by these cultural biases
to allow medical monitoring recoveries.2 7
Moreover, the fact that so many of these toxic exposure cases have
environmental implications-carcinogens such as asbestos, for example, are seen
to pollute the natural environment-invokes the sizeable and presumably influential
apparatus of the environmental movement."' The authors suspect that some of the
judges who approve of court-mandated medical surveillance may be attracted by
the prospect of enlisting the deterrent potential of tort law in wider efforts aimed at
cleaning up the environment. More generally, academic tort law
commentators-especially authors of student notes-have traditionally tended to
applaud judicial innovations aimed at increasing the liabilities of corporate
defendants perceived to be harming helpless plaintiffs." 9 We submit that at least
some of the judges who have recognized the rights of plaintiffs to insist on medical
surveillance regimes of dubious personal and social value may have been
encouraged by cheerleaders-environmenialists and legal academics-registering
their enthusiastic approval from the sidelines.
And finally, it should be noted that these medical monitoring claims are an
important component in the evolving phenomena commonly referred to as "mass
torts" and "toxic tort litigation." Members of the plaintiffs' bar have an obvious and
enormous financial stake in these proceedings; they are almost certainly the major
beneficiaries of the successes enjoyed thus far. Significantly these medical
monitoring claims may turn out to be uniquely suited to class action treatment. In
general, courts have been hostile toward nationwide class certification in cases
involving classic tort claims for monetary damages flowing from physical
injuries. 210 In contrast, court-ordered programs designed to provide claimants with
205. See generally McCarter, supra note 146, at 24546 & nn.102-104.
206. A proponent of recovery in these cases concludes her analysis by observing that
"[re] cognition [of medical monitoring claims] by all courts would go a long way toward healing the
wounds inflicted when individuals are unwittingly exposed to toxic substances." See Blumenberg,
supra note 146, at 716.
207. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 202, at 758 (observing that courts may be influenced by
the cultural pressures of collective concerns over risks and that courts "have a role to play in
preventing excessive reactions to availability cascades").
208. It is no coincidence that at least half of the proponents of recovery for medical monitoring
have approached the subject from an environmental perspective. See, e.g., Blumenberg, supra note
146, at 661-62, 675-78.
209. See supra note 146. The authors cannot verify this observation empirically, and certainly
intend no criticism of the authors. We opine from our experience that judicial innovation is,
understandably, more intriguing to legal academics than are defenses of the status quo. We confess
to being old-fashionedly skeptical of innovation. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 514-24 (1976).
210. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (overturning
certification of class consisting of individuals exposed to asbestos who had reached settlement with
defendant). See generally Maskin et al., supra note 133, at 546 ("[It is clear that 23(b)(3) [class
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nonmonetary relief, preferred by the academic proponents of medical monitoring,2 '
may be viewed as injunctive and equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules.212 And while courts have denied
class certification in medical monitoring cases under Rule 23(b)(3),213 advocates
favoring expansion of class action practice continue to insist that even medical
monitoring claims seeking monetary recoveries are inherently susceptible to class
treatment, essentially on the ground that factual variations among claimants and
variations in applicable law are not so troubling here as in other areas of tort.214 The
authors do not think it merely coincidental that the major thrust of the expansionary,
prorecovery movement afoot in twenty American jurisdictions and widely
applauded by legal commentators may also lend itself to being handled through the
class action mechanism. Even if the cases recognizing claims for exposure-based
medical surveillance to date have not necessarily involved class certification,2 5
judicial acceptance of the substantive aspects of these cases will very likely be
aided and abetted in the future by the availability of procedural mechanisms with
which to consider-and settle-massive numbers of claims in a single judicial
proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
Asbestos litigation has been plagued by the willingness of some courts to front-
load damages and allow recovery for "injuries" that in all likelihood will never
eventuate. In the early days of asbestos litigation when the single-action rule still
actions are] an avenue which has been closed to many future mass-tort plaintiffs.").
211. Even skeptics agree that court-ordered programs are the only sensible approach. See, e.g.,
McCarter, supra note 146, at 283 ("Some form of equitable relief, such as the trust fund endorsed in
Ayers for governmental defendants, is the sole valid objective of future medical monitoring claims.").
212. See, e.g., Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475, 476-77 (W.D.N.Y.
1995). But see Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473, 480 (D. Colo. 1998) (stating that
medical monitoring case was essentially a suit for damages); Boggs v. Divested Atomic Corp., 141
F.R.D. 58, 67 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (noting that plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims are "poorly-
disguised money damage claims").
213. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 656 (Ct. App. 2000).
214. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Fabrice N. Vincent, Class Certification ofMedicalMonitoring
Claims in Mass Tort Product Liability Litigation, SE01 ALI-ABA, 10-19 (1999) (pointing out that
several courts have certified state-wide class actions).
The authors do not subscribe to the view that factual variations in medical monitoring cases are
insubstantial. It will be recalled that the United States Supreme Court in Amchem refused class
treatment for asbestos claims because it found the variation among claimants to be so substantial that
commonality was lacking. Aichem, 521 U.S. at 629. In cases where medical monitoring is sought,
the factual variations may be even more substantial. Since the claims are not based on any
manifestation of an asbestos-related disease, but only on exposure to asbestos, the court must confront
factual variations among claimants regarding whether any given plaintiffwas exposed to asbestos and
the level of any such exposure. Furthermore, questions as to the type of medical monitoring sought
and whether such monitoring would confer a benefit on any plaintiff in allowing early detection of
a curable disease will vary depending on the plaintiff. These highly individualized factual variations
seriously question the appropriateness of class treatment.
215. See supra notes 138-45.
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held sway, the reason for front-loading damages was understandable. If plaintiffs
were not able to. recover for all ensuing harms when they first discovered some
physical indication that they might contract an asbestos-related disease in the future,
they might be barred if they actually developed such a disease in the future. The
long latency period for asbestos diseases made it almost certain that statutes of
limitations would bar them from bringing their fully matured causes of action. Now
that the overwhelming majority of courts have held that the single action-rule does
not apply to latent toxic tort cases, plaintiffs can wait to see whether they actually
develop a serious asbestos-related injury in the future.
Not willing to wait on the morrow, plaintiffs have sought to convince courts
that they should be compensated for present suffering. They have argued that even
though they are asymptomatic, they are entitled to recover for mental distress
arising from their present fear that they will develop future injury and that they are
entitled to medical monitoring awards so that they can determine whether they will
need to be treated for some disease that may develop in the future. The huge
majority of claims made under both of the above theories have been made on behalf
of plaintiffs who have been exposed to asbestos or have developed some minor
changes in their lungs evidenced by pleural plaque or pleural thickening. The
likelihood that these plaintiffs will develop a malignancy in the future is very
remote. Recovery for mental distress for fear of such remote harms has no support
in the case law recognizing the tort of negligent infliction of mental distress.
The medical monitoring claims are equally attenuated. To respond to such
claims it is necessary to provide medical surveillance for all plaintiffs who have
only a slight increase in risk of developing malignancies in the future. The specter
of a massive, never-ending que of claimants is very real. Moreover, as the massive
number of uninjured claimants presenting anticipatory claims devours the
defendants' resources, those defendants are forced into bankruptcy leaving nothing
for those whose ills, whey they eventually manifest themselves, are not the least bit
speculative. This problem has already pitted lawyers who represent the seriously
injured against their cohorts who represent the unimpaired. The asbestos saga has
been a tragic chapter in American social history. It need not have become a tragic
chapter in American jurisprudence. But it has and it will remain so unless courts put
an end to the madness.
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